It naturally follows from that mteractlon that civil-m&tax-y relations are a subject co which Clausewltz devotes conslderable attention One of the Prussian theonst's bestkno\yn concepts IS the "paradoxical trmlty" of the people, the commander and his army, and qe government, all three of which are essential to wage war successfully 5 Although Clause&Itz cautions agamst polmcal leaders making Ill-informed military Judgments.6 he neveitheless mslsts that it 1s the prerogative of those leaders to determine the objectives of a tiar and the means by which they are pursued ' President Lincoln needed a general who rnderstood the goals he set and acknowledged his authority to set them. General
McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac. was not that man But for one leg of the triad --the gokemment --to establish a proper balance with the second leg --the commander --It was necessary for the third le, * --the people --to be consulted, m this case at -he ballot box The 1862 congressional elections, m bhlch the Republicans.
despl;e setbacks, mamtamed then-edge over the Democrats. that provide decisive advantages. Clausewltz writes. are "surprzse, the benefit of terrazn, / and cwzcentrzc attack " the first and last of which predommantly, and the middle exclusively, favor the defender I6 For these and other reasons, Clausewltz avers that ' defepse ES a strongerform of war than attack "I7 All the same. he notes that It \;Gould / "cant 1 adlct the very idea of war to regard defense as Its final purpose," because defense 'has a negative object" and "should be used only so long as weakness compels, and be aban 4 oned as soon as we are strong enough to pursue a positive object," 1 e , take the offeqive l5 I Both Lee. m attempting to carry the mar to the North, and Bumside, m striving to take Richmond with a blow too swift to parry, had shown themselves wlllmg to "pursue a positive object " The Southerner, however. displayed greater respect for the supenor metaphoncal. the actual charging was done by the nearly 13,000 Cmon dead at 1 Fredericksburg, more than sixty percent of whom died in the assault on the stone wall that not one of them reached '* Clausewltz did not claim that his theses offered mfalhble guidance on the conduct of warfare Quite the opposite, he urged readers to approach all "rules ' of military theory with a healthy skepticism. Nevertheless, the battle of Fredericksburg demonstrates the I truth m a number of his precepts, which a commander would do better to heed than to ignore And If Lee displayed the better mtultl\e sense of Clausewltzlan thmkmg than did Burnside. his instincts were not flawless Clausewltz advises that -'[o]nce a defender has gamed an important advantage he must strike back, or he will court destruction ""
Furthermore, "the complete or partial destruction of the enemy must be regarded as the sole 'objet: of all engagements Y730 Lee, hoNever, did not press his advantage against the battered Army of the Potomac, which slipped across the river under cover of darkness / and h\ed to fight --fight Izzm --another day Though Lee was vlctorlous at Fredencksburg, the fog and frlctlon he surmounted along the Rappahannock would exact its toll on the Confederates at Gettysburg eight / months later To gl\ e Clausewltz the las-1~ ord "In war the result 1s never final *31 'shrvel and Pfalz 52 , "Clausewaz, 370 301bld , 227 311bld , 80
